A programming notation is introduced that can be used for protecting secrecy and integrity of data in global computing applications. The approach is based on the explicit annotations of data and network nodes. Data are tagged with information about the allowed movements, while network nodes are tagged with information about which nodes can send data and spawn processes over them. These restrictions/annotations are used to confine the movement of data and processes. First, a general framework for describing global computing applications is proposed and the issues related to confinement are discussed in such a context. Then, the general framework is instantiated onto three models for process interaction and mobility, namely cKlaim (the kernel of Klaim), Dπ (a distributed version of the π-calculus) and M 3 (a variant of the Mobile Ambient Calculus). For all of these formalisms, it is shown that their semantics guarantees that computations proceed only while respecting confinement constraints. It is proven that, after successful static type checking, data can reside at, and cross only, authorized nodes. Possible "localizations" of this property are discussed that require checking only relevant sub-nets. Finally, the theory is used to model secure behaviours of a UNIX-like multiuser system. * This work is partially based on a preliminary paper appeared in [21] and it has been partially supported by EU FET -Global Computing initiative, project MIKADO IST-2001-32222. The funding bodies are not responsible for any use that might be made of the results presented here.
Introduction
In the design of programming languages for global computing, the integration of security mechanisms is a major challenge and great efforts have been recently devoted to extend standard programming languages with such mechanisms. Several language-based security techniques have been proposed in the literature that range from type systems [25, 9, 8, 19] , to data flow analysis [22, 31, 14, 7] , to in-line reference monitoring [15] , to proof-carrying code [30] . The interested reader is referred to [32] for an overview of some of these techniques.
The major goal of language-based security is to design languages that are flexible, expressive and safe. Unfortunately, these are often contrasting requirements. For example, the possibility of exploiting mobile code deeply increases flexibility and thus expressivity of programming languages, but it introduces new security problems related to unwanted accesses to classified data. Indeed, when programming has to take into account open networks, existence of malicious principals, that put security of data at risk, must be assumed. Malicious nodes can attack a mobile process and compromise its integrity, through code modification, or its secrecy, through leak of sensitive data. But one has also to take into account malicious mobile processes that might attempt to access or forge private data of the network nodes hosting them.
A network aware programming language should thus be equipped with a foundational model that also encompasses security features. The proof that an application is 'safe' could then be done by relying on formal methods. In our view, the language security model should consider existence of misbehaving entities in the execution environment of applications, and should rely only on local knowledge of such environment. The latter condition is necessary because it would be impossible to collect global information in a network with malicious nodes that can be under the control of any of the thousands of different administration authorities.
The major contribution of this paper is the definition of a framework that, by relying on program annotations, guarantees secrecy of data on hosting nodes and of data carried by mobile processes. Our approach is inspired by Confined-λ [26] and is based on the explicit annotations of data and network nodes with sets of node addresses, called regions, that are used to confine data and process movements. Data annotations enable programmers to control the set of nodes that can share specific data, and permits hiding them to other nodes. Node annotations, instead, enable node administrators to control the set of data and processes that can be hosted by each node, and this permits refusal of malicious processes and unwanted data.
The language semantics guarantees that all computations proceed according to region constraints. For example, a process P can access a datum d only if P 's execution does not export d outside its region, say r, i.e. if P only writes d in network nodes included in r or, similarly, if P only carries d while migrating to nodes included in r. Enforcing similar constraints implies a form of code inspection, that would be too expensive if entirely performed at runtime. A preliminary static type checking improves efficiency.
Our approach is largely independent of a specific programming language; in a preliminary version of this work [21] it was presented for the process language µKlaim [19] , a minimal sublanguage of Klaim (Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility, [13] ). In this paper, we set up a general framework for programming global computing applications (Section 2.1), and discuss our proposal and various issues related to confinement relatively to the abstract calculus (Section 2.2). We then instantiate the general framework onto three models for process interaction and mobility, namely cKlaim (core Klaim [20] , a simplified variant of Klaim [13] ) in Section 3, Dπ (Distributed π-calculus [25] , a distributed variant of the π-calculus [29] ) in Section 4, and M [12] , a variant of the Mobile Ambient Calculus [10] ) in Section 5.
(Mobility Types for Mobile Processes in Mobile Ambients
For each of these calculi, we show how their syntax can be obtained as an instance of the generic formalism. Then, we define their operational semantics and the associated type systems, and prove that the resulting semantics guarantees that computations proceed only while respecting confinements. This ensures that, after successful static type checking, data are manipulated only by authorized users. Moreover, since in such dynamic environments we cannot assume knowledge of the whole net, we also establish a more general result, namely that absence of violations of data annotations is guaranteed for all successfully type checked sub-nets, regardless of the configuration and of the evolution of the whole net they are in. For the sake of simplicity, we develop our theoretical framework for the monadic and first order versions of the three calculi. But, for the sake of readability, in the examples we shall use the polyadic variant of the calculi.
In Section 6 we shall apply our approach to a larger example, and shall describe the secure implementation of a UNIX-like multiuser system. Comments on the differences between the three typing systems and a review of related work are postponed to Section 7.
A Generic Formalism for Global Computing
In this section, we shall informally present our approach. To this aim, we first introduce an 'abstract' calculus for programming global computing applications; then we illustrate our approach by intuitively describing the usage of types over this generic formalism. Instances of the abstract setting for cKlaim, Dπ and M 3 will be presented in Sections 3, 4 and 5.
Basic Features
We have distilled the ingredients for a calculus for global computing in Table 1 . A net is an unordered collection of nodes. Each node is referrable via an address addr, is linked to the nodes of the net whose addresses are in links and hosts a process P . Processes are built up from the stuck process Nil by using action prefixing, parallel composition and replication (denoted by the operator * ). In the most basic setting, we only consider four features of the calculus, namely, data exchange, modification of net topology, creation of new execution threads and creation of new resources. Each of these features is implemented by one or more actions, whose informal semantics we shall describe below. We would like to remark that, since at this level we do not want to take a definite standing on the choice between direct or indirect communication, we shall use tgt to indicate a communication medium.
• Snd(data, tgt) sends the information data by exploiting the communication medium tgt.
• Rcv(par, tgt) receives information from the communication medium tgt and binds it to parameter par. In some cases, par is also used for selecting one of several information available in tgt by using pattern matching mechanisms.
• Conn(dest) connects the node performing the action to the node denoted by dest. When this command is executed, the set links of the executing node is extended with dest.
• Disc(dest) disconnects the node performing the action from the node denoted by dest. When this command is executed, the set links of the executing node is reduced by removing dest.
• New(addr, links, P ) creates a fresh node hosting process P whose address is addr, and whose connections are those in links.
• Exec(P, dest) spawns process P for execution over the node denoted by dest.
• Res(name) creates a fresh name name, and restricts its visibility making the name unknown to any other process of the net.
By properly instantiating tgt and by properly defining the operational semantics of the primitives, several communication paradigms can be recovered. We shall give examples of both local/remote and synchronous/asynchronous communications, based either on channels or on shared memory.
A Typing Discipline for Controlling Data Movement
We would like to set up a machinery based on typing that helps in protecting exchanged and local data in global computing applications. To this aim, we suggest annotating data with sets of network addresses, describing the sub-net where data can be used; these sets will be called regions. The annotations allow programmers to fix the nodes that can share a given datum, and to avoid the datum is accessed by untrusted nodes. Also network nodes are annotated with regions that specify the nodes that can send data/processes over them. This mechanism allows the administrator of a node to control the data/processes the node can host, and to refuse malicious processes and unwanted data. Thus, nodes are annotated with two regions, say r d and r p . In general, we should have r p ⊆ r d since accepting processes is, in general, more dangerous than accepting data; however, no restriction is imposed with respect to this.
In the setting of the generic formalism presented in Section 2.1, our typing approach can be implemented by letting regions to be either finite subsets of addresses and parameters or the distinct element (used to refer to the whole set of addresses and parameters). The set of all regions R, ranged over by r, can be partially ordered by the subset inclusion relation ⊆, and has as top element. Data sent via the Snd operations are annotated with regions as follows
Similarly, nodes in the generic formalism become
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the absence of a region annotation stands for .
The language semantics should guarantee that computation proceeds according to these region constraints. For example, a process P can access some datum d only if P 's execution does not force the datum to appear outside its region (namely, if P writes d only in nodes of d's region and if P carries d while migrating only to nodes of d's region). Similarly, a node (whose address is) addr can send data/processes over a node (whose address is) addr only if addr accepts data/processes coming from addr (i.e. addr is in the region annotation of addr ). This property is called safety and is formalized by the following definition. To better understand the properties we want to model and the impact of our approach on system security, we shall consider a simple example. Suppose that a client C requires a service to a server S. Once S has verified the credentials of C (e.g. its identity or its credit card information), it sends back a secret password, that C can change. C could then access the service by using the last set password. This protocol can be modelled in our generic formalism assuming two network addresses, addr C and addr S , hosting the processes below. In the example, we shall use a function access( ) for associating 'access points' to nodes. The exact nature of these access points and the way Snd and Rcv operation exchange data would depend on the nature of the communication. For instance, in case of a channel-based synchronous communication, access(addr S ) will return a valid channel for communicating with addr S and the Snd/Rcv are fired simultaneously. For the sake of simplicity, we are relying on remote, polyadic communications and on a mechanism that permits decomposing received data according to the structure of the parameters specified for receiving them. Here and in the rest of the paper, we omit trailing occurrences of stuck processes, as usual. Notice that, since C's request is marked with region {addr C , addr S }, only processes at the locations of C and S will be enabled to capture C's request. Thus, no denial of service attacks mounted from other nodes aimed at cancelling the request can take place. Similar considerations hold for the secret password PWD that S sends back to C (it is a shared secret between processes at C's and S's locations). To make our theoretical framework properly working, we need to control the processes arriving at C's and S's locations; this is why our typing discipline requires nodes to be annotated with regions. E.g., to avoid denial-of-service attacks, server S should not accept processes coming from other nodes of the net (alternatively, it could accept only processes coming from trusted nodes). On the contrary, it should accept data from any user; this is necessary to model a scenario where S accepts any service request, while it supplies the service only to those users whose credentials are acceptable.
In the example above we have assumed the possibility of performing remote communication; in case only local communication is allowed, we would need to replace Snd(. . . , access(addr S )) with Exec( Snd(. . . , access(addr S )) , addr S ).
cKlaim: Core Klaim
We start by applying our approach to cKlaim [20] , a calculus at the core of the language Klaim [13] . The theory developed here simplifies the presentation of [21] in that it only permits monadic communication and models infinite behaviours via replication (instead of recursion).
In cKlaim, the unique category of names is the set of locality names L, ranged over by l; thus, name and addr of the generic formalism are instantiated to l. Identifiers, ranged over by , can be locality names or variables (ranged over by x), and represent both the communicable data and the target of (possibly remote) actions; therefore, data, tgt and dest of the generic formalism are instantiated to . T denotes cKlaim parameters (par in the generic formalism) for pattern matching. cKlaim data are represented as special processes l .
By letting data to be special processes, we have that each node hosts processes and a (possibly empty) multiset of data. In the following, we assume that in (well formed) processes data are never prefixed by an action. By using Linda [16] terminology, we shall call tuple space (TS, for short) the Table 2 : cKlaim Syntax multiset of data hosted by a node and we let it to represent the repository of the node. cKlaim nodes are written l r d :: r p P . The two region annotations control the nodes that can send data or processes to l, as established by the node administrator. We remark that no explicit set of links is specified for cKlaim nodes; we assume that the graph underlying a cKlaim net is fully connected 1 , hence Conn(dest) and Disc(dest) are not implemented. The remaining actions are instantiated as follows.
• Snd([data] r , tgt) is implemented as out([ ] r )@ . When executed, it will create a new datum (whose region is r) in the TS at . Communication can be remote and relies on a shared memory paradigm.
• Rcv(par, tgt) is implemented as in(T )@ ; when this command is executed, if T = !x, a datum l will be withdrawn from the TS of and x will be replaced by l in the continuation. If T = , then the action will look for (and retrieve) a datum at the TS of node (if any). This second kind of input action is a form of name matching operator.
• Exec(P, dest) is implemented as eval(P )@ ; it spawns process P for execution over the node referred to by .
• Res(name) and New(addr, links, P ) are implemented by the primitive newloc(l) that creates a fresh locality name l that is used as the address of a new node tagged by the region annotations of the creating one and hosting process nil.
The syntax of cKlaim is given in Table 2 . Identifiers occurring in process terms can be bound. More precisely, prefix in(!x)@ .P binds variable x, while newloc(l).P binds locality l; in both cases, P is the scope of the binding. An identifier that is not bound is called free. We let fv(P ) to denote the set of free variables in P . As usual, α-conversion allows to freely rename bound identifiers without captures. In the sequel, we shall assume that bound identifiers in processes are all distinct and different from the free ones (this is always possible by using α-conversion). Finally, we shall only consider for execution closed nets, i.e. nets where each occurrence of a variable is bound by an in prefix (similarly to many real compilers, we consider terms with free variables as programming errors).
Typing cKlaim Nets
The language presented in the previous section is a mean to program applications where, during the computation, a datum can only appear in localities contained in its region annotation. The runtime semantics can enforce this requirement by performing appropriate checks. To make the semantics as efficient as possible, a preliminary typing phase is introduced. The activities of the static typing are based on the following requirements:
1. a datum [l] r can be seen at (i.e. can cross) if ∈ r 2. a process retrieving a datum [l] r cannot exhibit l outside r.
The typing phase performs check 1. statically and annotates parameter formal fields with regions to enable efficient execution of check 2. at runtime. To better distinguish the annotations put by the programmers/administrators from those put by the type system, we shall write the latter ones as superscripts and the former ones as subscripts. Hence, the syntax of parameters becomes
r states that the datum replacing x will cross at most the localities in r. The typing procedure for cKlaim nets is given in Table 3 . Net typings are written N N . The typing step includes a type checking phase, to verify that nets are written accordingly to the region annotations therein, and a type inference phase, to annotate parameter formal fields. Intuitively, the inference phase takes a net N (written according to the syntax in Table 2 ) and returns a net N obtained from N by annotating all the parameter formal fields with a region containing the nodes that the received values will cross. E.g., in process in(!x)@l.out([x] r )@l the declaration !x of variable x must be associated to region r. The type checker verifies that each process located at a node l contains only data that can be seen by l (this is done by the judgment l ) and verifies that actions out and eval send data/code to nodes where the data/code can appear without violating the region annotations.
The auxiliary function reg( ) returns the intersection of the data regions occurring in its argument. Moreover, relies on an auxiliary procedure Γ P Γ P where the type environment Γ is a finite map from variables to regions such that fv(P ) ⊆ dom(Γ). Thus, the procedure ∅ P ∅ P is defined only if P is closed; in that case, for each formal parameter in P , a region annotation describing the use of that field in the continuation process (i.e. where it will be sent) is determined and used to decorate P (thus obtaining P ). Such regions are determined by the type inference by considering the locality where the process runs (the decorating ) and by examining the localities where the variables can appear upon execution of actions out and/or eval. Notice, however, that care is needed to avoid that closed nets become open. As an example, consider the nodes (both of them are legal)
Typing Nets: Blindly annotating these nodes would result in
that are open because of the occurrence of y in the regions of !x and !y, respectively. The solution we designed to accept ( ) is to assign !x the region annotation . This is reasonable since in([!x] {l,y} )@l means 'retrieve a datum from l and share it with a generic locality of the net' (indeed y can be dynamically replaced with any locality name). The solution we designed to accept ( ) is to remove y from !y region annotation and assume that a locality can always occur in the node having that locality as address.
An anomaly somehow related to ( ) is
that would result in the annotated process
Here the problem is that the l occurring in the annotation associated to !x by the inference system escapes from the binder newloc that declares l . Thus, these two occurrences of l are not the same! We overcome this problem by simply removing l from the region annotation of !x. This is reasonable since, as we shall discuss when presenting the operational semantics, a created node (l ) is assumed to be an 'alias' of the creator (l) in that l is as trustworthy as l. Thus, if a datum can appear at l then it can appear at l too.
To rule out anomalies like ( ) and ( †), we use in Table 3 two functions. Function Γ , used to rule out the first anomaly, takes as parameter a finite set of variables S and is inductively defined as
where denotes union between environments with disjoint domains. Function Γ , used to rule out the second anomaly, takes as parameter a finite set of locality names S and is inductively defined as
Function + extends the information of an environment through another environment and is undefined if the domain of the second environment is not included in that of the first one; formally
Before concluding this section, we briefly comment on some typing rules. Notice that the typing of N also verifies that N is closed. In rule (cK-T-Out), the type checker verifies that can stay both in the hosting locality and in the target locality . The continuation process P is typed in the environment Γ, thus obtaining the annotated process P and the environment Γ . Hence, the result of the typing will be out([ ] r )@ .P together with Γ extended with the information that the variables occurring in (i.e. x if = x) could be seen at r. Similar observations also hold for rule (cK-T-Eval); in particular, the check that the process can cross the locality where it is hosted is performed whenever the process is going to migrate. Rules (cK-T-Match) and (cK-T-New) require no special attention; just notice that, in (cK-T-New), the resulting environment is Γ {l} to rule out anomalies like ( †). Finally, in rule (cK-T-In), the procedure should type P in the environment Γ extended by associating x to region { }. At the end of this typing phase, the region annotation calculated for x is associated to the parameter !x. Notice that x can occur in x's region r, generating anomalies like ( ); to avoid this, the annotation for x must be r − {x} calculated by the procedure. Moreover, it is possible that x occurs in Γ region annotations because of anomalies like ( ); thus, the environment resulting from this phase must be Γ {x} . We deem well-typed those nets that successfully passed a typing phase. Table 2) such that N N . 
Definition 2 (Well-Typed cKlaim Nets) A net N is well-typed if there exists a net N (written according to the syntax of
(cK-Out) l ∈ r d l r d :: r p out([l ] r )@l .P l r d :: r p P − → l r d :: r p P l r d :: r p P | [l ] r (cK-Eval) l ∈ r p l r d :: rp eval(Q)@l .P l r d :: r p P − → l r d :: rp P l r d :: r p P | Q (cK-In) r ⊆ r l r d :: rp in([!x] r )@l .P l r d :: r p [l ] r − → l r d :: rp P { l /x} l r d :: r p nil (cK-Match) l r d :: r p in(l )@l .P l r d :: r p [l ] r − → l r d :: r p P l r d :: r p nil (cK-New) L l r d :: r p newloc(l ).P − → L {l } l r d ∪{l } :: r p ∪{l } P l r d ∪{l } :: r p ∪{l } nil (cK-Call) l r d :: rp * P − → l r d :: rp * P | P (cK-Split) L l r d :: r p P1 l r d :: r p P2 N − → L l r d :: r p P 1 l r d :: r p P 2 N L l r d :: r p P1 | P2 N − → L l r d :: r p P 1 | P 2 N (cK-Par) L N1 − → L N 1 L N 1 N 2 − → L N 1 N 2 (cK-Struct) N1 ≡ N 1 L N 1 − → L N 2 N 2 ≡ N2 L N 1 − → L N 2
cKlaim Typed Operational Semantics
cKlaim nets are executed according to the reduction relation − → defined in Table 4 . − → relates configurations of the form L N , where L is such that loc(N ) ⊆ L ⊂ f in L and function loc(N ) returns the set of localities occurring in N . In a configuration L N , L is needed to ensure global freshness of new addresses. For the sake of readability, when a reduction does not generate any fresh addresses,
We denote with L L the disjoint union of sets L and L . The semantics exploits substitutions, ranged over by σ, i.e. finite partial maps from variables to locality names. Given a tuple of distinct variables x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and a tuple of locality names l = (l 1 , . . . , l n ), the substitution mapping each x i to l i will be written as { l / x}. For any syntactic term (variable/region/process/type environment) t, the application of σ to t, denoted by tσ, is the term obtained by simultaneously replacing each x ∈ fv(t) ∩ dom(σ) with σ(x), with renaming of bound names of t possibly involved to avoid captures. We remark that the application of a substitution to a process P also acts on the region annotations in P .
The reduction relation relies on a structural congruence relation, ≡, equating α-convertible processes, stating that " " is commutative and associative, and that nil acts as the identity for "|".
We now comment on the semantics rules. Rules (cK-Out) and (cK-Eval) say that a datum/process can be put over the target of the out/eval only if such a node accepts the datum/process (i.e. l ∈ r d and l ∈ r p ). This is necessary to prevent an untrusted node l to send data/code over l . Notice that no static check could enforce this property without loss of expressivity: e.g., in in(!x)@l.eval(. . .)@x, it is statically impossible to know which locality will replace x without limiting the possible exchanges over l. Thus, it is impossible to determine if the locality executing the eval is trusted by the target locality or not. Rule (cK-In) says that a process can retrieve a datum only if the continuation process respects the datum annotation (i.e. r ⊆ r). If a datum is present in the target of the action for which this check succeeds, then the datum is retrieved and replaces the parameter in the continuation; otherwise, the process is suspended until such a datum is available (if ever). Rule (cK-Match) verifies if a datum l is present in l . If this is the case, the datum is removed and the continuation proceeds; otherwise, the process is suspended. Notice that no checks involving region r are performed: indeed, l already knows l .
2 In rule (cK-New) the set L of localities already in use is exploited to choose a fresh address l for naming the new node. Moreover, we assume that a node l trusts every node l it creates. This is reasonable since, once created, l is not known to any other node in the net; thus, l can use it as a private resource and can decide the nodes of the net that can know it (by also exploiting region annotations). For the sake of simplicity, l is assigned the trust regions of l. However, it would be easy to extend the language for allowing the programmer to explicitly specify the trust regions of a newly created node. Rule (cK-Call) unfolds a replicated process and corresponds to a procedure call. Rule (cK-Split) permits splitting the parallel processes running at a node thus enabling the application of the main reduction rules that, in fact, can be used when there is only one thread running at l. Technically, a parallel over processes is transformed into a parallel over nodes. Rules (cK-Par) and (cK-Struct) are standard: the former says that, if part of a composed net evolves, the whole net evolves accordingly and the latter says that structural congruent nets have the same reductions.
We now give two simple properties of the operational semantics. The first one describe the relationship between the set of localities L in a configuration L N and the localities occurring in the net obtained after a reduction step. The second one ensures integrity of the parallel components located at a node.
Proof: The proof is an easy adaption of the corresponding one in [19] .
: r p P be a node of N . Then, for any parallel component P in P it holds that: (i) either P was located at l in the initial configuration N , or (ii) P is a datum written at l by a node in r d , or (iii) P is a process spawned to l by a node in r p .
Proof: By a straightforward induction on the length of inference for loc(
To conclude this section, we implement in cKlaim the example given in Section 2.2. In this setting, the addresses are l C and l S with region annotations such that l S ∈ r
< modif y password y and access the service >
< handle password modif ications and provide the service >
Type Soundness
Our main results state that well-typed nets always reduce to well-typed nets and that well-typed nets do respect region annotations. The former result is called subject reduction and states that the property of being well-typed remains invariant during reductions; the latter result is called type safety and states that well-typedness guarantees that there are no immediate violations of data regions. Together, these results imply the soundness of our theory, i.e. no violation of data regions will ever occur during the evolution of well-typed nets (i.e. well-typed nets are safe, according to Definition 1). We start by proving two standard technical results for a type system. The first one states that structural congruence preserves well-typedness. The second one freely permits to discharge some entries from a typing environment by replacing them with localities in all terms involved.
Lemma 1 (Subject Congruence) If N is well-typed and N ≡ N then N is well-typed.
Proof: The proof trivially proceeds by induction on the length of the inference used to derive judgment N ≡ N .
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference used to derive the typing judgment. The base case is when only rules (cK-T-Nil) and (cK-T-Datum) are used: in both cases it is trivial to conclude. Let us consider the inductive case and reason by case analysis on the last rule used to infer the judgment. We explicitly show the most significant cases; the remaining ones are easier.
Hence, by using rule (cK-T-In), we can conclude the wanted
We now distinguish three cases:
In this case Γ = Γ and r = r 2 ; thus, Γ σ = Γ σ. By using rule (cK-T-Out), we can conclude the wanted Γσ
2. 1 = x. Now r = r 2 ∪ r 1 but Γ = Γ ; this suffices to conclude like in the previous case.
3. 1 = y = x. In this case r = r 2 and Γ = Γ + {y : r 1 }; thus, Γ σ = Γ σ + {y : r 1 σ} is defined. We can then conclude like before.
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference of
Notice that the sets of localities loc(N ) and L do not play any role (namely, they do not affect the definition of well-typed net) and will be ignored in the rest of the proof.
Base
Step: We reason by case analysis on the axioms (i.e. the first six rules) of Table 4 .
By the premises of rule (cK-T-Out), ∅ Q l ∅ P and l ∈ r. This suffices to conclude that N = l r d ::
(cK-Eval). This case is similar. Indeed, by the premise of rule (cK-T-Eval), it holds that there exists a process Q such that ∅ Q l ∅ Q .
(cK-In). By hypothesis, N results from the typing of a net
The main thing to prove is that the well-typedness of l r d :: rp in([!x] r )@l .P implies the welltypedness of l r d :: r p P { l /x}. By the premise of rule (cK-T-In), it holds that {x : {l}} Q l {x : r } P for r = r − {x}. Hence, by Lemma 2, ∅ Q{ l /x} l ∅ P { l /x} . This suffices to conclude.
(cK-Match) and (cK-New). These cases are easy.
(cK-Call). By hypothesis, there exists a process Q such that ∅ * Q l ∅ * P . By the premise of rule (cK-T-Repl), ∅ Q l ∅ P . Thus, by using rule (cK-T-Par), we can conclude.
Inductive
Step: We reason by case analysis on the last applied operational rule of Table 4 .
(cK-Split). By hypothesis, we have that N = l r d ::
However, Γ must be ∅ as well; indeed, it can be easily checked that (cK-Par) and (cK-Struct). By a straightforward induction; the latter case relies on Lemma 1.
We now turn to type safety. As we already said, it states that well-typedness guarantees the absence of immediate violations of data regions. However, the wanted safety property requires that data regions are respected along all possible computations. To properly formalize this property we need to define a finer semantics. Indeed, deeming a net to be safe when "for any node l r d :: r p P it holds that l occurs in the region of each datum in P " is not satisfactory because the regions annotating data disappear upon withdrawal of the data. Thus, it becomes impossible to formalize the requirement that the region specification associated to a datum when it is produced is respected during all the life of the datum (i.e. also after its retrieval). For example, consider the net N = l r d ::
Upon execution of the action, the net becomes N = l r d :: rp P l r d :: r p nil, where P = P { l /x}. Now, all the occurrences of l in P are not annotated anymore with region r. Hence, in N we have no mean to formalize the statement that l can use l by respecting the original annotation r.
To overcome this problem, we design a tagged language, where each occurrence of a locality in a process is tagged with a region determining its visibility. To this aim, we slightly adapt the syntax of cKlaim, by letting identifiers to be :
We can now formalize when a net is safe. To this aim, we extend function reg defined in Table 3 by taking into account also the locality tags when calculating the region intersection. For example,
Definition 3 (Safety, adapted from Definition 1) A net N is safe if for any l r d :: rp P in N , it holds that l ∈ reg(P ).
The tagged semantics generalizes that in Table 4 . Indeed, processes like out( 2 can evolve. These terms may arise upon application of substitutions that now map Table 5 : Tagged Typing Rules locality variables into localities tagged with regions. However, we let the application of the substitution σ to a region to replace variables only with localities (hence omitting their tags) thus ensuring that regions are still sets of localities and variables. The reduction relation, however, ignores the tags and considers tagged names as plain ones. This is expected because, as we said before, the only role of tags is to enable formalizing and checking that a net is safe. Thus, rules (cK-Out) and (cK-In) now become
To avoid confusion, we use the arrow − → → to relate tagged terms. The other rules extend those in Table 4 in the expected way. The typing procedure for tagged terms is denoted by and its most significant rules are given in Table 5 (the other ones are simple adaptations of those in Table 3 ). We use functions pid( ) and reg( ) to denote, respectively, the plain locality and the region of the tagged identifier . The key idea underlying is that, whenever an identifier occurs at a locality, the locality must be included in the region tagging the identifier.
Given a plain net N , we use tag(N ) to denote the set containing all the well-typed (w.r.t. ) tagged nets obtained by tagging localities in N . Given a tagged net N , we denote with untag(N ) the plain net obtained from N by removing all the locality tags. Notice that tag(N ) is never empty because it always contains the net obtained by tagging each locality in N with . We call the latter net the outset tagging of N (we shall use outset taggings later on).
Predictably, the tagged language and the original one are strongly related. Moreover, the typing of tagged terms is preserved along (tagged) reductions. The following results formalizes these properties.
Proposition 3
The following facts hold:
Proof: Easily follows from definition of − → → and of . We are now ready to prove the type safety theorem.
Theorem 2 (Type Safety) If N is a well-typed tagged net then N is safe.
Proof: By definition, N is a well-typed (tagged) net if there exists a net M such that M N . The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference leading to this judgment and heavily relies on the checking pid( ) ∈ reg( ) contained in each rule of Table 5 .
By denoting with − → →
* the reflexive and transitive closure of − → →, the wanted soundness result can be formulated as follows.
Corollary 2 (Type Soundness) Let N be a (plain) well-typed net and N be its outset tagging. Then loc(N
Proof: By Proposition 3.3 and by the fact that N ∈ tag(N ), it holds that N is a well-typed tagged net. We now proceed by induction on the length of − → → * . The base case is Theorem 2; the inductive case trivially follows by exploiting Corollary 1.
The results given above can be generalized by requiring only a subnet of the whole net to be well-typed 3 . We call r-subnet of N the net formed by all the nodes l r d :: rp P in N such that {l} ∪ r d ∪ r p ⊆ r. Notice that such a net is not necessarily defined for all r; of course it is always defined for r = and coincides with N (in this case Theorem 3 coincides with Corollary 2).
Theorem 3 (Localized Type Soundness) Let N be a plain net and N be its outset tagging. If the r-subnet of N is defined and well-typed, and if loc(N ) N − → → * L N , then the r -subnet of N is defined and safe, where r = r ∪ (L − loc(N )).
Proof: By exploiting Theorem 2, we only need to show that the r -subnet of N is defined and well-typed. We just consider the case for loc(N ) N − → → L N ; the more general case is recovered by using an inductive argument similar to that in Corollary 2. The proof proceeds like that of Theorem 1. Just notice that, when the operational rule used to infer the reduction is (the tagged version of) (cK-Out) or (cK-Eval) resp., the premise l ∈ r d and l ∈ r p respectively turns out to be crucial to maintain well-typedness. Moreover, the only non trivial case for establishing if the r -subnet is defined is when the operational rule used is (cK-New). In this case, the claim is easily proved since the new node is assigned the regions of the creating one 4 .
Dπ: Distributed π-calculus
We now apply our approach to Dπ [25] , a variant of the π-calculus [29] with process distribution and mobility. In Dπ, there are two categories of names: locality names L, ranged over by l, and channel names C, ranged over by a. The symbol e is used for channel or locality names, while u, v, called identifiers, denote names and variables (ranged over by x). Thus, name and addr of the generic formalism are instantiated to e and l, respectively. The target of a communication (i.e. the communication medium) can be either a channel or a variable (that has to be dynamically replaced by a channel), while the destination of migrations can be either a locality or a variable (that has to be dynamically replaced by a locality). Thus, tgt and dest of the generic formalism are both instantiated to u. The messages exchanged data, ranged over by W , can be both identifiers and compound identifiers of the form v@u (where u is expected to be a locality name or variable, while v is expected to be a channel name or variable). Similarly, parameters par of the generic formalism can either be a simple variable x or a compound variable z@y (y is a locality variable and z is a channel variable); parameters are generically referred to as X. Dπ nodes (located threads, in the original terminology) are written l
and, like in cKlaim, it is implicitly assumed that there exists a link between every pair of nodes. Thus, Conn(dest) and Disc(dest) are not implemented. The remaining actions are instantiated as follows.
• Snd([data] r , tgt) is implemented as u! [W ] r and makes available message W (with associated
region r) over the channel u of the locality where the action is fired. Communication is local, synchronous and channel based.
• Rcv(par, tgt) is implemented as u?(X). It retrieves a message W from channel u of the current node and replaces the parameter with the message in the continuation. When parameter X is a simple variable x, the datum retrieved must be a single name e. Otherwise, if X is z@y, then the message must be of the form a@l; z will be replaced by a and y will be replaced by l.
• Exec(P, dest) is implemented as go u; it spawns the continuation process for execution over the node referred to by u.
• Res(name) is implemented as (νe) and, when executed, creates a fresh name e. If e is a locality name l, the primitive also allocates a node with address l hosting the stuck process stop. Thus, (νl) implements both Res(·) and New(·, ·, ·).
The syntax of Dπ is given in Table 6 . Similarly to cKlaim, identifiers occurring in process terms can be bound ; more precisely, prefix u?(X).P binds the variables in X (i.e. it binds x if X = x and binds both y and z if X = z@y), while (νe)P binds name e; in both cases, P is the scope of the binding. The set of free variables fv( ), α-conversion and closed nets are defined accordingly.
To conclude the presentation of Dπ syntax, we explain why we associate two regions to each Dπ node. Indeed, since no remote output is allowed, the data region could seem useless. However, using only the process region would be too restrictive: in fact, if a node l does not know or trust another node k, then k has no mean to come into contact with l. Our solution permits to distinguish generic processes from processes that are not very risky because, for example, they only perform an output and then terminate. These last processes are of the form u! W .stop and we call them output processes. However, more general processes could be accepted: e.g. process u! W .v! W .stop is as risky as u! W .stop. Since we do not want to take a definite standing on the set of output processes, we use a predicate output(P ) that holds true if and only if P is an output process but leave aside its exact definition. We will exploit predicate output(·) when defining the operational semantics. Thus, output processes coming from k are accepted by node l Table 7) . 
Typing Dπ Nets
The typing system for cKlaim of Table 3 could be straightforwardly adapted to deal with Dπ nets; see Appendix A. However, in a channel-based setting region compatibility checks can be statically performed (on the contrary, they are dynamically performed in cKlaim -see rule (cK-In)) because it is natural to associate each channel with a region annotation describing the region of the data exchangeable over it. Thus, if a channel a can carry data visible within r, then messages with region r 1 ⊇ r can be sent over a and parameters with region r 2 ⊆ r can be used to retrieve data from a. By transitivity, we get r 2 ⊆ r 1 thus ensuring that the use of the datum respects the specifications of the datum region. Hence, in this setting, parameters do not need to be annotated because the correct use of the datum is statically enforced by the typing system. To properly deal with name passing, we have to use some of the theory from [25] . The resulting type system is very different from that in Table 3 but shows how our approach can be adapted to different typing theories. We assume the following types: Typing Nets:
Typing Processes:
Typing Messages: The typing system for Dπ nets is given in Table 7 . The main judgment is Γ N , stating that N is well-typed in the environment Γ. A type environment is a finite partial function mapping locality names and variables to locality types. We shall only consider typing environments satisfying the following constraint: 
‡) it must be that r ⊆ reg(Γ(u)) and r d ⊆ dreg(Γ(u)) and r p ⊆ preg(Γ(u)).
This condition states that the component r is really useful only when v is a variable; in this case, it collects the possible names v can assume at run-time. Moreover, it states that regions r/r d /r p must respect the corresponding specifications contained in Γ for all the values v can assume.
We assume that Γ N holds true only if Γ satisfies ( ‡), if Γ does not contain variables and if fv(N ) = ∅. The main judgment relies on two auxiliary judgments for typing processes and messages. Judgment Γ u P states that P can be properly executed in u while respecting Γ; we always assume that fv(P ) ⊆ dom(Γ). Judgment Γ u W : τ states that message W can be assigned by Γ exactly type τ at u.
Some aspects, like the extension of an environment with a new item (written Γ, u W : τ ) and the subtyping relation (written τ τ ), have been straightforwardly adapted from [25] and are given in Table 8 . We omit comments on these features and refer the interested reader to [25] . We now briefly comment on some of the typing rules. In rule (D-T-LRes), we assume that the created node is assigned the regions of the creator (this is similar to cKlaim -see rule (cK-New)). In rule (D-T-In), it is checked that u can access channel v (the fact that v is a channel is ensured by the fact that Γ indirectly assigns v a channel type through the type of the locality where v is placed) and that the continuation properly uses the received message (i.e. P is typed in an environment obtained by extending Γ with the information that X has type at most τ , the type of the value carried by v). Similarly, in rule (D-T-Out), it is checked that u can access channel v, that message W can be assigned at least type τ in u by Γ, that u can see W and that the region specified for W is at most the region of the values that v can carry. Finally, rule (D-T-Go) verifies that u can see v and all the identifiers occurring in P ; moreover, it verifies if u can send P to v (by exploiting the data/process region of v according to the fact that P is an output process or not) and typechecks P in v.
To conclude, we define well-typed Dπ nets.
Definition 4 (Well-Typed Dπ Nets) A net N is well-typed in Γ if Γ N . A net N is well-typed if there exists a typing environment Γ such that N is well-typed in Γ.
(Dπ-Comm) l 
Dπ Operational Semantics
Dπ nets are executed according to the reduction relation −→ defined in Table 9 . Like in cKlaim, −→ relates configurations of the form K N , where K is a set of localities and localized channels (thus, Substitutions are generalized so that now they map parameters to messages and their application keeps into account also the structure of the message/parameter involved. In particular, in P { W /X}, if W is a name e, then X must be a simple variable x and the application replaces x with e in P ; otherwise, if W is a compound message a@l, then X must be a compound variable z@y and the application replaces z with a and y with l in P . Like in cKlaim, substitution application also acts on the region annotations in P .
The reduction relation relies on a structural congruence relation, ≡, equating α-convertible processes, stating that " " is commutative and associative, and that stop acts as the identity for "|".
We now comment on the Dπ peculiar operational rules; the others are similar to the corresponding ones of cKlaim. Notice that in most rules region annotations are not exploited, thanks to the typing. Rule (Dπ-Comm) states that the producer and the consumer of a datum must locally synchronize over a named channel a; no dynamic check is required because of the powerful static checking. Rule (Dπ-Go) moves the continuation process to the node target of the go ; notice that the static typing has already verified that k accepts data/code from l (i.e. l ∈ r d or l ∈ r p , according to the fact that P is an output process or not). Rules (Dπ-NewLoc) and (Dπ-NewChan) handle name restriction. The first one creates a new node addressed by the fresh locality name k; k enlarges the creator's regions that, similarly to cKlaim, are assigned to the new node too. The second rule allocates a new channel in the current locality. In both cases, the set K of names already in use is exploited to choose a fresh name.
Before concluding, let us implement in Dπ the example given in Section 2.2. Like in cKlaim, the addresses are l C and l S with region annotations such that l S ∈ r 
. < modif y password y and access the service >)
handle password modif ications and provide the service >)
Channel req is used as the access point to the server for requiring the service, while pwd is a fresh channel used to transmit secret passwords between the client and the server.
Type Soundness
We now prove subject reduction and type safety for the type system of Table 7 . The type soundness will be an easy corollary of these properties. We start with the corresponding versions for Dπ of Lemmas 1 and 2; then we state and prove subject reduction and type safety. To this aim, we define Γ with K for N as the typing environment extended with the fresh names in K that can type N . Formally,
where we let to denote both the disjoint union of sets and the union of functions with disjoint domains. The γ and the φ in the second and third case above are the minimal types (w.r.t. ) such that Γ with K for N N .
Remark 1 Notice that it is not always the case that Γ with K for N is defined; however, if it is defined then N is well-typed.
Lemma 4 (Substitutivity) Let W be such that fv(W ) = ∅. Then, the following facts hold:
Proof: The proof of the first claim is similar to the corresponding one in [25] , once the subtyping relation used is that defined in Table 8 . To prove the second claim, we distinguish three cases (the last one relying on the first two) according to the structure of parameter X: X can be u (and clearly u is a variable), or X can be x = u, or X can be y@z. We now proceed by induction on judgment Γ, v X : τ u P and considers only the first two cases above; the third one is recovered by considering { a@l /y@z} as the composition of the two singleton substitutions { a /y} and { l /z}. The base case is trivial. For the inductive cases, the proof is tedious. We just show the most delicate case, i.e. when (D-T-Out) is the last rule applied; for notational convenience, we let Γ = Γ, v X : τ . By hypothesis, 
val(Γ(X)). Hence, we can state that val(Γ(u{
• Snd([data] r , tgt) is implemented as [u] r . It makes available message u tagged with region r within the current ambient.
• Rcv(par, tgt) is implemented as (x). It retrieves a message u from the current ambient and replaces x with u in the continuation.
• Conn(dest) is implemented as in u. When the action is executed by a process contained in an ambient n, it moves n in a sibling ambient whose name is u (if any). Let us suppose that initially m encloses n. Then, the links are changed by removing from m a link to n, by replacing in n the link to m with a link to u, and by adding to u a link to n.
• Disc(dest) is implemented as out u. When the action is executed by a process contained in an ambient n, it moves n out of its enclosing ambient (whose name must be u). Let us suppose that initially m encloses u. Then, the links are changed by removing from u a link to n, by replacing in n the link to u with a link to m, and by adding to m a link to n.
• Exec(P, dest) is implemented as to u and moves the continuation process to u.
• Res(name) is implemented as (νn) and, when executed, creates a fresh restricted name n.
• New(addr, links, P ) is implemented as amb(u, P ) and creates a new ambient named u (within the current one -i.e. linked only to the current one), hosting process P . Notice that ambients possibly nested in u can be programmed by adding further amb actions within P .
The syntax of M 3 is given in Table 10 . Similarly to cKlaim, identifiers occurring in processes can be bound. More precisely, prefix (x).P binds variable x, while (νn)P binds name n; in both cases, P is the scope of the binding.
To conclude, we want to comment on our choice of using M 3 instead of the Mobile Ambient Calculus. The motivation is that M 3 is equipped with a specific primitive for process migration, to, which is of the same vein of cKlaim's eval and Dπ's go (in fact, to has been inspired by go ). 
Hence, the datum d escapes from n (actually, ambient n was dissolved by the open primitive). Thus, only very strong typing requirements would preserve the integrity of d; but assuming these typing disciplines would make programming a well-typed net very hard.
Typing M 3

Nets
The typing approach we present in this section is similar to that of Dπ. In the setting of M 3 , types are defined as follows:
Intuitively, an ambient has type r r [T ] r p r d if its name is in r and it can be seen and enclosed by all ambients in r; the ambient accepts incoming processes sent by ambients (whose address is) in r p and accepts data sent from ambients in r d . Moreover, the ambient hosts processes exchanging data of type T , the local conversation topic. Topics of conversations were introduced in [9] ; here we use them in a similar way and denote with Shh the absence of exchanges in the ambient. The typing procedure for M 3 systems is presented in Table 11 . It is somehow inspired by the basic typing of [9] and also includes some features we have already presented for Dπ in Section 4. We now comment on the M 3 peculiar operational rules. Rule (M-In) moves the ambient n executing the action inside a sibling ambient m. Symmetrically, rule (M-Out) moves the ambient n executing the action outside the enclosing ambient m. Rule (M-To) moves a process thread in a sibling ambient m. Rule (M-Comm) describes communication between co-located processes. In rule (M-Res), the set A of names already in use is exploited to choose a fresh name n that is associated with the regions of m extended with n. Thus, if an ambient named n will be created (rule (M-New)), it will be assigned these regions. Finally, rule (M-Amb) states that, if the content of an ambient evolves, then the whole ambient evolves accordingly.
Before concluding, let us implement in M 3 the example given in Section 2.2. The server and the client are modelled as two sibling ambients whose names are n S and n C . The region annotations should be such that n C ∈ r S d and n S ∈ r C d . Processes P C and P S now become 
Type Soundness
We now prove subject reduction and type safety for M 3 ; the proofs are similar to that presented for Dπ in Section 4.3. Here, we only illustrate the most significant differences. First, Γ with A for N is the least environment that type checks N such that
The technical lemmas to extablish subject reduction are, like before, subject congruence and substitutivity. 
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on Γ, x → T u P . The proof is long and tedious because we must inspect all typing rules; here, we explicitly consider one of them, namely (M-T-In). In what follows, for the sake of readability, we let Γ = Γ, x → T .
Whenever (M-T-In) is the last rule applied in the inference, it must be that P = in u.Q. Thus, Γ (u) = r r [T ] {n} ∪ r p ∪ r d ⊆ r and its enclosing ambient is contained in N too. Since along the computation it can happen that sometimes the r-subnet is not defined and sometimes it is, the hypothesis of definiteness of the r-subnet is not preserved. Thus proving a localized formulation of the type soundness result would be harder because the inductive argument on the number of reduction steps is not applicable anymore. We leave this task for future work.
A Realistic Example: Implementing a Multiuser System
In this section we use the framework presented so far to program a simple but meaningful example in cKlaim; the implentations in the other calculi can be derived straightforwardly. For the sake of readability, we will use parameterized process definitions and strings. Moreover, we borrow from [19] polyadic communication, i.e. the possibility of exchanging tuples of data, and the primitive read that behaves similarly to in but, after its execution, it leaves the accessed data in the TS.
We present the behaviour of a simple UNIX-like multiuser system, where users can login (exploiting a password-based approach) and use the system functionalities, which consist in reading/writing files or executing programs. For the sake of presentation, we shall present the system in three steps and, finally, we shall merge them together. Let l S be the address of the server, be its data trust region and ∅ be its process trust region (thus no user can spawn code to l S ).
User Identification. We start with programming the identification of different users via passwords. Localities play the role of user IDs. Let l p be a private repository used by l S to record the registered users and their passwords. Thus, l p hosts the tuples
Let l be a user wanting to log in l S . If l is already known to l S (i.e. it is one of the l i s), then l can use a process like
for communicating with the server process
Intuitively, l requires a connection by sending its user ID (its locality) and its password; the server checks if this information is correct and sends back an ack, activating the continuation of the computation at l. Notice that the region annotations of pwd and "logged" rule out denial of service attacks of a nasty intruder (aimed at cancelling the request of login or the corresponding ack) and preserve the secrecy of the password. If the user is not registered in l S yet, he can send an "hello" request to the server containing its address and wait for a password
The server then handles this request with the process
Of course, a locality l different from l can send l S a request for a new password pretending to be l: the only difference with the "hello" message given above is that the message now should contain also l in the data region. However, the server will report the new password to l and the region associated to the password will ensure that pwd will not leave l. Thus, l can withdraw pwd only by sending a process to l and then acting in l with the new password. This can be possible only if l trusts l , implying that l accepts this 'suspicious' activity of l .
The File System. We now consider a server handling a file system where different users can write/read data. Let l f be a private repository used by l S to store the files. A file named N , whose content is the string S, that can be read by users in r and written by users in r , is stored in l f as the process
Intuitively, "read" and "written" are just dummy data used to properly store regions r and r . Then, the server handles requests for reading and writing files with the following processes
Intuitively, the first in action collects the request for reading/writing the file named n performed by locality u; then the following read action, once type checked 5 , verifies if the locality replacing u has the read/write privilege over file n. Finally, the required operation is performed (the content of the file is read or the old content is replaced with the new one) and an acknowledgement (containing the kind of operation performed, the name of the file and, in the "read" case, also its content) is reported to u.
Executing Code-on-Demand. In this last scenario, a user can dynamically download some code from the server to perform a given task. The server stores all the downloadable processes in a private locality l c . For each process named N , whose code is P and that is downloadable by nodes in r, the server stores in l c the component
Then, when a user wants to download some code, the server handles his request with the process
Notice that l c cannot directly send P for execution to u because (the locality associated to) u cannot have l c in its trust region (since l c is fresh). Thus, P must firstly cross l S and then, if l S is in the process trust region of u (which we assume it is the case), the code-on-demand procedure successfully terminates, by also reporting an ack to the user.
The System. Finally, we can put together the activities shown so far to obtain the implementation of the complete activity of the server. Thus, the (not yet typed) initial configuration of l S would be l S :: ∅ newloc(u 1 ).newloc(u 2 ).newloc(u 3 ) . < set up u 1 with the identites and passwords of the users > . < set up u 2 with the data of the f ile system > . < set up u 3 with the downloadable processes > .
5 Indeed, the type inference for actions read works similarly to actions in. Thus, it annotates the first read of the two processes as read(n,
They will be successfully executed at runtime only if the locality replacing u is in the region annotating the dummy items "read" and "written" respectively, i.e. u can access the file required in the specified modality.
Our example simplifies UNIX behaviour in two major aspects. Firstly, we did not require that a user must login before using the functionalities offered by the system; secondly, the files/programs are put by the system and not by the users. Both these choices were driven by the aim of simplifying the presentation; however, our setting could be easily enriched with more refined and realistic features.
Finally, we want to remark that, by exploiting the dummy data "read", "written" and "downloaded", we have enforced an access control policy by only using region annotations. This confirms that, in spite of its simplicity, the approach we presented in this paper is very powerful.
Conclusions and Related Work
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a typing discipline for delimiting the network region where data and processes can safely move. Our types can be used to block execution of actions that could compromise confinement specifications. The typing discipline has been illustrated at an abstract level by showing how it can be used on a generic formalism for global computing, that captures different communication paradigms and different forms of mobility. Our approach has also been integrated with the type systems of three concrete calculi for process distribution and mobility. To keep the underlying motivation of these calculi, when adapting their type theories to our setting, we have added the smallest amount of information possible.
We would like to conclude by commenting on the instantiations of our abstract approach; this should help in understanding the different concrete approaches and the underlying principles of the three calculi. We shall also contrast our approach with related work.
Assessment. Among the calculi presented in this paper, only M 3 exploits node links. However, the way links are used in M 3 is quite limited, because it permits implementing only tree-like net topologies. We believe that the extension of the theory for cKlaim to explicitly consider connections (like in [6, 20] ) would improve usability without complicating the typing. In our view, the ideal language would be one where nets are plain collections of nodes and where node connections are implemented as explicit net components. Semantics would be simple and expressivity would be high (indeed, more general graph topologies could be programmed). We prefer this approach to the one taken by Ambient-like calculi that merge the syntactic categories of nets and processes and hide node connections within syntax. Indeed, this fact complicates the semantics, as witnessed by [11, 28] .
When considering the issue of static vs dynamic inference in the three settings, we notice that the typing for cKlaim requires more dynamic checks than those for Dπ and M 3 . By following an approach similar to that for M 3 , one could require that also in cKlaim the data exchanged within a node have all the same type; then, we would have that the additional runtime checks of cKlaim could be avoided, and a typing discipline similar to that presented in Section 5.1 could be developed. However, we consider too demanding to require that cKlaim nodes contain only data of the same type. This is reasonable assumption for Dπ channels (channels can be seen as the methods that a node makes available for the processes it hosts) and for M 3 ambients that can be assigned the same type (due to their hierarchical organization, ambients can be seen as logical partitions of the same memory space).
In our view, there is a thread-off between simplicity, efficiency and implementability. The type system for cKlaim is simple and easily implementable (types are just sets and operations on types are unions, intersections, subset inclusions, ...), but, its runtime semantics is less efficient due to the dynamic checks used in rules (cK-Out), (cK-Eval) and (cK-In). Nevertheless, we believe that this dynamic burden is acceptable, because it only requires efficiently implementable operations over sets. On the contrary, Dπ and M 3 have a very efficient runtime semantics (no type related check is present) but the price paid is a more involved static semantics and a not straightforward implementation. Indeed, implementing the original type system of Dπ [25] requires a lot of technical work (see [27] ); our type system relies on [25] and hence its implementation should be even harder. Similar considerations also hold when dealing with type inference algorithms for Ambient-like calculi (see, e.g., [33, 12, 17] ). To emphasize this point, we have added an Appendix where it is described a simple adaption to Dπ and M 3 of the approach developed for cKlaim. The new type systems (and their implementability) should be compared with those of Sections 4.1 and 5.1.
Node regions could be handled more dynamically by extending the languages with actions for adding and removing nodes from regions (in this way, e.g., a node can choose if to trust newly created nodes). But, this more expressive framework would require additional runtime checks. In particular, none of the two requirements given at the beginning of Section 3.1 could be statically enforced. Thus, the typing systems could only infer regions for the arguments of process actions to make dynamic checks more efficient.
Related Work. A lot of work has been recently devoted to languages for mobile processes with security mechanisms based, e.g., on type systems [25, 9, 8, 12, 19] , on control and data flow analysis [22, 31, 14, 7] and on proof carrying code [30] . The approach presented here is related to all of these techniques. It exploits a type system for annotating elements of the calculus and/or checking that the semantics respects the annotations. Typing keeps track of the movement of data with a technique similar to control flow analysis. Run-time checks over the origin of agents/data (like those, e.g., of (cK-Out) and (cK-Eval)) assume an authentication mechanism (e.g., processes travel with a certificate giving evidence of their origin) which is a form of proof carrying code.
Our work has been inspired by that on Confined-λ [26] , a higher-order functional language that supports distributed computing by allowing expressions at different localities to communicate via channels. To limit the movement of values, programmers can associate regions to them; a type system is defined that guarantees that each value can roam only within the associated region. There are however some differences with our approach. First of all, we consider not only channels but also other communication media that require more dynamic typing mechanisms. Then, we permit annotating only the relevant data while in [26] , a programmer must declare a type (i.e. a region) for all constants, functions and channels of a program. Moreover, the type system of [26] assumes a global typing environment for handling shared channels; this is in conflict with the requirement of a global computing setting. We do not rely on any form of global knowledge; when typing a net, only the annotations in the process are considered and information about the environment is inferred from the local use of channels and ambients (in Dπ and M 3 resp.) or by inspecting the code (in cKlaim). Finally, we also provide 'localized' formulations of the soundness theorem that guarantees that well-typing of a given subnet is preserved also in presence of untyped contexts.
The group types for the Ambient calculus [9] have purposes similar to ours. A group can be seen as a set of ambients and is used to express properties of ambient movement (e.g., "an ambient whose name is in group G can enter an ambient whose name is in group H"). This can be used to control movements of ambients and their visibility in different regions of a net. However, also the group approach relies on global knowledge of the execution environment and requires typing the whole net.
Finally, we want to consider a lower level approach to protect visibility of data via encryption. Encrypted data can appear in all the net, but can be effectively used only by the users that know the decryption key. Some process calculi have been recently extended with cryptographic primitives (see, e.g., Spi-calculus [5] , SJoin-calculus [4] and Applied-π-calculus [3] ), and security-oriented typing theories have been developed for them [1, 2, 18] . At an abstract level, one could consider the content of an encrypted message as visible only in the region containing the nodes knowing the decryption key. Thus, one could assume that our approach could be implementable via a cryptographic calculus. However, an important difference must be stressed. When encryption is used, the producer of Typing Nets:
Typing Processes: encrypted data can control access to (plain) data only by controlling visibility of the decryption key. But this can be hardly controlled: once a decryption key has been passed on, information leakage can lead to revealing the key, and thus to loosing control of data. Within our approach, a data producer can decide in advance the users enabled to access the data; and this information is preserved during any evolution of the system. Notice, however, that indirect information flows can still be generated; for an account of these problems and some possible solutions we refer the interested reader to [23, 24] .
